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Abstract
The topological structure of the power grid plays a key role in the reliable delivery of electricity and
price settlement in the electricity market. Incorporation of new energy sources and loads into the grid over
time has led to its structural and geographical expansion and can affect its stable operation. This paper
presents an intuitive analytical model for the temporal evolution of large grids and uses it to understand
common structural features observed in grids across America. In particular, key graph parameters like
degree distribution, graph diameter, betweenness centralities, eigen-spread and clustering coefficients,
as well as graph processes like infection propagation are used to quantify the model’s benefits through
comparison with the Western US and ERCOT power grids. The most significant contribution of the
developed model is its analytical tractability, that provides a closed form expression for the nodal
degree distribution observed in large grids. The discussed model can be used to generate realistic test
cases to analyze topological effects on grid functioning and new grid technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
The power grid refers to the complex network of energy generators, consumers and connecting
transmission lines that are involved in the delivery of electricity. The advent of the ‘smart grid’
has added further complexity to the system due to the introduction of new renewable generation
resources and flexible consumer demand response. These advances have the potential to make
the grid green as well as to reduce electricity pricing. To understand their impact correctly, such
technologies need to be implemented on test cases that reflect the structure and functionality of
current as well as future grids. Traditional power grid test cases used in literature are generally
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2much smaller in size compared to real grids [1]. From a topological perspective, there is thus a
need to develop test cases that mirror the common trends in large grids around the world, and
more so to provide an explanation for the temporal evolution of such common observations.
Modeling the power grid is a growing field of research. Past research has demonstrated that
the performance of the power grid is dependent on its topology, normally represented by the
adjacency matrix or the degree distribution. Albert et al. [2] have established the importance of
the physical network of the power grid in determining its vulnerability to random and directed
attacks. It is worth mentioning that there is a body of work categorizing the degree distribution
observed in the underlying network of large power grids. [3] reports the presence of exponential
nodal degree distribution while considering power plants, substations, and 115 - 765 kV power
lines of the North American power grid. The exponential degree distribution is also reported for
the Western US power grid in [4]. Hines et al. in [5] suggest an exponential degree distribution
in the Eastern, Western and Texas Interconnects in North America. A clear exponential tail
distribution for the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) is mentioned in [6].
Similarly, [7], [8], [9] mention an exponential degree distribution for power grids in several
European countries, namely Italy, UK, Ireland, Portugal, and for the entire connected component
in the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission Electricity, UCTE. It is thus fair to state
that despite differing geographical shapes and terrains, power grids across America and Europe
possess an exponential distribution or, in the least, an exponential tail for the nodal degrees.
This distinguishes power grids from other studied networks like social networks that tend to
have power-law/scale free distributions.
Similarly, generative models for the observed exponential degree distribution in the power
grid can be found in literature. [10] presents the well-known small-world generative model
where nodes get connected to neighbors in a ring lattice and links get rewired between nodes
to form the final graph. [6] develops a model called RT-nested-Smallworld based on the Watts
and Strogatz small-world model. Nodes, in this model, lie on a ring lattice and are linked to
their neighbors with some probability. These links are then rewired following a Markov chain
to develop the final network. The model presented in [6] approximates the NYISO power grid
well, though it requires several tunable parameters to obtain the optimal fit. This results in the
model yielding limited intuition regarding the origin of the observed network structure. One
major drawback of such generative models, from an explanatory viewpoint, is that they presume
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3a static original network configuration. In reality, power grids are dynamic and evolve with time
due to addition of new nodes (buses) and edges (transmission lines). Further the aforementioned
model does not describe the spatial nature of the power grid with physical nodes distributed
over a geographical area. In related work, networks demonstrating a power-law nodal degree
distribution like the internet and airline network have been explained using the Barabasi-Albert
model [11]. [12] presents a modified generative model based on the Barabasi-Albert model for
exponentially distributed networks. Here, new nodes enter the network and gets connected to
existing nodes either randomly or with a probability that gives preference to nodes with higher
degrees. Besides the absence of spatial nodal placement, this model is restrictive as it uses the
principle of ‘the rich gets richer’ which clearly does not apply to power grids.
The primary goal of this paper is thus to provide a spatio-temporal generative framework that
intuitively explains the common trends observed in evolving grids and in particular, provides an
analytical expression for the observed nodal degree distribution. To demonstrate the efficacy of
our approach, we also compare important features including diameter, node and edge between-
ness, spread of eigenvalues and graph clustering of our generative model with real grids, notably
the Western US and the ERCOT grids. Note that analytical models like ours, unlike detailed
modeling and simulation tools, do not lead to an exact match for all characteristics observed in
the real world. Instead, our model provides an accurate approximation for common structures
with the additional benefit of mathematically tractability for important network measures. General
information on the relative advantages and approximations associated with network modeling
techniques can be found at [13].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the mathematical
characterization of the empirical node degree distributions observed in two power grids in
America. The generative framework for modeling the evolving grid is introduced in Section
III along with the theoretical analysis of the resulting node degree distribution. The correctness
of the nodal degree distribution is shown through comparison with two power grids, the Western
US and ERCOT grids, in Section IV. The diameter calculations for our generative model for
different sizes of the network are discussed in Section V. It is followed by a comparison of
the node and edge centrality measures between real grids and generated networks in Section
VI. The distribution of node clustering coefficients and spread of eigen-values for the available
power grids are presented in Section VII and VIII respectively. Finally, dynamics of infection
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Fig. 1. Observed node degree distribution p.d.f in power grids (a) Western US (b) ERCOT
propagation processes on networks generated by our model and real grids are discussed in Section
IX. Concluding remarks are summarized in Section X.
II. CHARACTERIZING THE EMPIRICAL NODE DEGREE DISTRIBUTION
Structurally, the power grid is a graph with nodes representing the buses in the grid and edges
representing the transmission lines connecting the buses. As mentioned in the Introduction, power
grids across the world have been reported to have node degree distributions that have exponential
tails. We consider three power grids in this paper, and evaluate the node degree distributions of
their representative networks. Fig. 1(a) shows the node degree distribution of the Western US
electrical power grid, which has 4941 nodes and 6594 edges. The network data for this grid is
freely available [10]. The second network we consider is the power grid in Texas that is under
the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) [14]. The connected graph has 5514 nodes
and 6522 edges and its node degree distribution is presented in Fig. 1(b).
We observe that for each power grid, the pd.f. of the degree distribution has a significant
exponential tail. Additionally, we note that each considered degree distribution increases in value
over a short interval preceding the exponential tail. The same trend has been reported for the
NYISO power grid in [6], where the increase at the beginning has been called a ‘kink’. Due
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5to the presence of the initial interval of increase, the node degree distribution deviates from an
exact exponential function. As elucidated in Figs. 1(a) and 1(b), the empirical degree distribution
is best fit by a shifted sum of exponential distributions characterized below:
pdf(d) =
∑
i
wie
− d−ki
µK I(d ≥ ki) (1)
where d denotes the degree of a node and wi and ki are normalizing constants and degree shifts
associated with each exponential. In the next section, we present our generative model that
produces temporally evolving networks with degree distributions similar to that of real grids.
III. GENERATIVE MODEL FOR POWER GRID NETWORK
A brief note on notation: we use P (.) to denote the probability of an event, and E(.) to denote
expectation. δ(.) represents the dirac delta function, α = 1− α and I(.) the indicator function.
We show in the previous section that power grids possess an degree distribution that can be
represented by a sum of shifted exponentials. Our goal here is to explain it using a temporally-
evolving generative model based on the framework of 2-D spatial point process theory. In our
model, Ntotal nodes are placed one at a time in space according to a two dimensional Poisson
point process Pλ with density λ. Here, edges/links between nodes are formed when a new node
is placed into the system. The new node connects to K of its nearest pre-existing nodes in
the network, where K is a parameter given by an integer-valued random variable with known
distribution. The growth step captures the expansion of power grids over time due to the creation
of new buses and resulting transmission lines. The parameter K here represents the tendency
of new nodes to form multiple connections to build robustness against failures in the physical
network. The selection of ‘nearest neighbors’ for edge formation minimizes the costs of building
transmission lines which require significant investment in real estate and copper. We now, prove
that our model of network growth provides the appropriate shifted-exponential degree distribution
observed in real power grids.
A. Analysis of the Degree Distribution of the Generative Model
We represent the geographical area covered by the grid by a disk R. The network evolution
in our generative model takes place in discrete time steps with one new node being born at each
step. The nodes are numbered in the order of their creation with the first-born node numbered as
March 2, 2015 DRAFT
61. From the network growth process described in Section III, it is clear that a new node born at
time t connects to an existing node a present in R if its location (chosen randomly) lies within
a’s ‘Region of Influence’ (Rat) - the area within R at time t such that for every point b within
that area, node a is amongst the K nearest neighbors of b. As shown in Fig. III-A, for K = 1
(new nodes link to their nearest neighbors), the ‘region of influences’ of existing nodes are given
by a first order Voronoi tessellation [15] in the disk R.
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Fig. 2. Region of Influence represented by Voronoi region for a 20 nodes system with K = 1
For K > 1, the regions of influence are given by overlapping Kth order Voronoi-regions. The
analysis of the degree distribution in the evolving network thus follows from the evolution of
Kth order Voronoi-regions defined by the existing nodes in R. As closed form expressions for
higher order (K > 1) Voronoi-regions seldom arise, we use a mean-field framework [16] for our
analysis instead. This technique involves replacing the dynamics of a single node at each step
with the average dynamics of the entire system.
We first consider the case where K (number of links formed by the new node) is a constant at
k. Note that due to creation of k edges, each new node gets a degree of k. Let N(m, t) denote
the average number of nodes of degree m at time t. At time t+ 1, N(m, t) increases if the new
node born into the system connects with nodes of degree m− 1, and decreases if the new node
links with nodes of degree m. Now the probability of forming an edge to a node of degree m is
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7proportional to the cumulative volume under ‘regions of influence’ of nodes of degree m. Note
that at each time step, the expected volumes of the kth order Voronoi-regions of all existing
nodes depend only on their positions (which are selected randomly) and not on the order of
their arrival into the system. Subsequently, each existing node has the same expected volume
of ‘region of influence’. Thereby the expected cumulative volume of the regions of influence
of nodes with degree m is proportional to the fraction of nodes with degree m. The average
increase in the number of nodes of degree m at a time step is thus given by the following relation
N(m, t+ 1)−N(m, t) =N(m− 1, t)k
t
− N(m, t)k
t
+ δ(m = k) (2)
Consider m = k. We have N(k, t+1)−N(k, t) = −N(k,t)k
t
+1. For large t, using Lemma 4.1.1.
in [17], this becomes
N(k, t)
t
=
1
1 + k
(3)
For m 6= k, we have
N(m, t+ 1) = N(m, t)(1− k
t
) +
N(m− 1, t)k
t
(4)
For large t, again using Lemma 4.1.2 in [17], we obtain
N(m, t)
t
=
limt→∞
N(m−1,t)
t
k
1 + k
(5)
⇒ N(m, t)
t
= (
k
1 + k
)(m−k)
1
1 + k
(6)
The average fraction of nodes n(d) with degree less than d, where d ≥ k, is given by
n(d) =
1
1 + k
+
1
1 + k
k
1 + k
+ ...+
1
1 + k
(
k
1 + k
)(d−k−1)
⇒ n(d) = 1− (1 + k
k
)(k−d) ≈ 1− e− d−kk (7)
Note that the cumulative distribution function converges to an exponentially decaying function
for constant K. Next, we analyze the case where parameter K is an integer valued bounded
random variable with known distribution. Let K take two values, k1 and k2 with probability
α and α respectively. Thus, K has a mean of µK = αk1 + αk2 where α = 1 − α. Note that
µK represents the average number of edges formed at each time step by a new node. The
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8temporal evolution in expected number of nodes of degree m, N(m, t+ 1) is then governed by
the following equation:
N(m, t+ 1)−N(m, t) = µKN(m− 1, t)
t
− µKN(m, t)
t
+ αδ(m = k1) + αδ(m = k2) (8)
As a fraction α of new nodes form k1 links, we have
N(k1, t+ 1)−N(k1, t) = −N(k1, t)µK
t
+ α.
For large t, using (3), this becomes
N(k1, t)
t
=
α
1 + µK
(9)
For k1 < m < k2, at large t, using (5), we have
N(m, t)
t
=
limt→∞
N(m−1,t)
t
µK
1 + µK
= (
µK
1 + µK
)(m−k1)
α
1 + µK
(10)
Similarly, for m = k2, at large t,
N(k2, t)
t
= (
µK
1 + µK
)(k2−k1)
α
1 + µK
+
α
1 + µK
(11)
Finally, for m > k2, for large t, using the same method we get:
N(m, t)
t
= (
µK
1 + µK
)(m−k1)
α
1 + µK
+ (
µK
1 + µK
)(m−k2)
α
1 + µK
(12)
Using Equations (9), (10), (11) and (12), the fraction of nodes n(d) with degree less than d is
given by
n(d) ≈ α(1− e−
d−k1
µK )I(d > k1) + α(1− e−
d−k2
µK )I(d > k2) (13)
Using an identical approach, it is clear that if K takes values ki with probability αi respectively
over some range of i’s, the nodal degree distribution is given by a weighted shifted sum of
exponentials:
pdf(d) =
∑
i
αi
µK
e
− d−ki
µK I(d ≥ ki) (14)
Validity of Mean-Field: We now discuss the correctness of using a mean-field model to
approximate the degree distribution in our analysis of the generative model. We first construct
a random variable Z(m, t) to represent the actual number of nodes of degree m at time t. Let
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9the locations of incoming nodes in the system be given by y1, y2 etc. beginning with the first
node. We can then obtain a martingale Zi(m, t) as follows:
Zi(m, t) = E(Z(m, t)|y1, y2..., yi) (15)
Note that the average number of nodes of degree m at time t, N(m, t) = Z0(m, t) = E(Z(m, t),
while Z(m, t) = Zt(m, t). Further, |Zi(m, t)−Zi−1(m, t)| ≤ 2kmax where kmax is the maximum
value that K can take. Using the Azuma-Hoeffding’s inequality [17] for martingale convergence,
we have
P (Z(m, t)−N(m, t) ≥ x) ≤ e− x
2
8k2t
⇒ P (Z(m, t)/t−N(m, t)/t ≥ x)→ 0 as t→∞
Thus, a mean-field approximation converges to the actual degree distribution. To elucidate
our analysis, we present Figs. 3(b) and 3(b) which include the degree distribution for two
networks given by our generative model with parameter K taking 3 possible values with known
probabilities. We see that the degree distribution in both cases is correctly fit by the expression
given in Equation (14). This demonstrates the accuracy of the mean-field result for our generative
model. Further it is worth noting that the nodal degree distribution of the generative model has an
initial rising component followed by an exponential tail, similar to the common trend observed
in degree distributions of real power grid networks. In the next section, we use our generative
model to fit real power grid data.
IV. COMPARING REAL POWER GRIDS WITH GENERATIVE MODEL
We look at the two power grid networks described in Section II and model them using our
generative framework. To model the Western US electric power grid (4941 nodes and 6594 edges),
the parameter K in the generative model is given values of 1, 2 and 12 with probabilities .54,
.45995 and .00005 respectively. Fig. 4(a) shows the comparison between the degree distribution
of the Western US electric power grid and the average degree distribution of a network with
equal number of nodes simulated using our generative model. Similarly, we model the ERCOT
power grid (5514 nodes and 6522 edges) using our generative model where parameter K takes
values of 1, 2 and 12 with probabilities .75, .24994 and .00006 respectively. Fig. 4(b) shows the
comparison of degree distributions for this case . Note that in either case, the support of K has
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Fig. 3. Fitting sum of shifted exponential p.d.f.s from Equation (14) to the node degree distribution produced by generative
model with parameter K being an integer valued variable with known distribution
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Fig. 4. Node degree distribution in real power grid and corresponding similar sized network given by generative model for (a)
Western US power grid (b) ERCOT power grid.
a size of 3, where K takes the largest value (> 10) with very lower probability (< 10−3). This
large value in K’s support models the few critical nodes in the grid that have degrees much
greater than the remaining nodes.
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The preceding theoretical analysis, simulation results and fitting with real grid data signify
that our intuitive generative framework is able to model the distribution of nodal degrees while
preserving mathematical tractability. Next we look at other important parameters that affect the
grid’s functioning and security and compare their trends seen in real data with our generative
model.
V. DIAMETER OF THE NETWORK
The diameter of a graph is the length of the longest route between any two nodes in the
graph. In power grids, the diameter affects the probability of fragmentation following a directed or
random adversarial attack on the network nodes and edges [3], [18]. This is observed as diameter
of the network is related to the prevalence of nodes with high degree critical for connectivity in
the grid. In general, the scaling of the diameter of the power grid network with the number of
nodes is hard to quantify due to varying topological constraints and geographical boundaries that
affect connectivity in the network. Fig. 5(a) presents the average diameter observed in power
grids with comparable average nodal degree as presented in [5], [6]. Note that the average
diameter of the network scales with the logarithm of the number of nodes. The diameter of
networks given by our generative model for different values of N (number of nodes) and K
(number of connections per incoming node) is shown in Fig. 5(b). We observe a logarithmic
scaling between the diameter and the network size for our generative model, that is similar to
observations in power grids.
VI. BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY OF THE GENERATIVE MODEL
In this section, we compare the betweeness centrality of graphs given by our generative model
with that of available power grid graphs. Betweenness centrality for a node i (denoted by li) or
an edge eim (denoted by lim) in a graph measures the number of shortest paths (with minimum
number of hops) in the graph that pass through that node or edge respectively [7]. For an
undirected graph with N nodes, betweenness centralities of every node and edge are given by:
li =
∑
j,k 6=i
njk(i)
njk
betweenness centrality for node i (16)
lim =
∑
j,k 6=i,m
njk(im)
njk
betweenness centrality for edge eim (17)
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Fig. 5. Diameter of the network v/s size of the power grid for (a) real power grids (b) generative model networks.
Here njk is the total number of shortest paths between nodes j and k while njk(i) is the number
of shortest paths between j and k that include node i. Similarly, njk(im) denotes the number
of shortest paths between j and k that pass through edge eim.
Higher value of betweenness centrality for a node or an edge indicates its greater relevance to
the robustness of the network. In particular, studies show that an attack on nodes with the largest
betweenness centrality values creates worse blackouts and loss of connectivity in a power grid
than an attack on nodes with the highest degrees [7], [19]. Further, [20] mentions the positive
correlation between the betweenness centrality of an edge in the grid with the amount of load
flowing on the edge. This enables the use of betweenness centrality in the analysis of cascading
outages in the power grid [21].
We plot the p.d.f.s of node and edge betweenness centralities (L) for Western US power grid
in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b). For each betweenness centrality measure, we also plot the average p.d.f.
obtained from a similar sized network given by our generative model. It is evident from the plots
that our generative model accurately predicts both the node and edge betweenness centralities
for the Western US power grid. Next we consider the ERCOT power grid. We show the p.d.f.s
of its edge and node betweenness centralities in Figs. 7(a) and 7(b) respectively and compare
them with the corresponding centrality measures of networks given by our generative model. We
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Fig. 6. Comparison between Western US power grid and similar sized network given by generative model for (a) Node
betweenness centrality (b) Edge betweenness centrality.
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Fig. 7. Comparison between ERCOT power grid and similar sized network given by generative model for (a) Node betweenness
centrality (b) Edge betweenness centrality.
observe that our generative model induces centrality characteristics that closely resemble that of
the ERCOT grid. Note that, to model the two power grids, our generative model uses values of
parameter K mentioned in Section IV.
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VII. NODE CLUSTERING OF THE GENERATIVE MODEL
Now, we look at the clustering of nodes in networks simulated with our generative model.
This refers to the phenomenon where neighbors of a node have links with one another leading
to the formation of clusters. One of the distinguishing features of social and physical networks
is that the clustering observed in them is higher than that of Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graphs. Here,
we focus on the node clustering coefficient and compare its distribution for power grid graphs
and those generated by our generative model. Mathematically, the clustering coefficient for a
node in graph G is defined as follows:
Ci = pii/Πi (18)
where pii is the number of edges that exist between neighbors of node i and Πi are the total
number of edges that can be formed using i’s neighbors. Clearly, Πi is given by di(di − 1)/2
where di is the degree of node i. The maximum value of the clustering coefficient is 1, and
attained for nodes that form cliques (complete clusters) with their neighbors. Fig. 8(a) shows
the distribution of clustering coefficients in the Western US power grid and that obtained on
average for similar sized networks produced by our generative model. The comparison for the
clustering coefficient distribution of the Texas power grid under ERCOT is given in Fig. 8(b).
Note that the clustering coefficient given by our generative model is similar to that observed in
real grids, though the performance is more pronounced for the ERCOT power grid.
VIII. EIGEN-SPREAD OF THE GENERATIVE MODEL
Eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of a graph is a key connectivity parameter that affects
the speed at which network processes like infection (discussed in later sections) and topological
vulnerabilities spread from one part of the network to another. Here, we plot the magnitude of
the largest five largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of power grid networks and compare
them with those observed on average in similar sized networks given by our generative model.
Though the general trend is similar, we note that our model is not able to simulate the largest
eigenvalue in the both the considered power grids. We plan to study the structural changes needed
to improvise the modeling the largest eigenvalue in the power grids in future work.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of clustering coefficient between real power grids and generative model networks. (a) Western US power
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Fig. 9. Comparison of spread of eigenvalues between real power grids and generative model networks. (a) Western US power
grid (b) ERCOT power grid
IX. VULNERABILITY OF THE GENERATIVE MODEL
Structural features of the power grid, in particular the parameters discussed in the preceding
sections, help determine the topological vulnerability of the grid to random and intentional attacks
by disruptive agents. Such attacks can, in principle, disrupt the secure operation of the grid and
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delivery of electricity to end users. In extreme cases, even a small disturbance inserted in the
system from outside can propagate to the rest of the network and cause a cascading outage. In
the past, topological failures in independent power grids as well as interdependent infrastructure
networks have been studied using different failure propagation models [22]. Our interest lies in
understanding if our generative model is capable of simulating failure propagation in real grids.
We consider two models of failure propagation in the power grid here: the SIS (Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible) model and the SIR(Susceptible-Infected-Removed) model [23], [24]. These
models were originally derived for studying infection propagation on biological networks. In the
power grid, the same models have been used to study the propagation of frequency oscillations
and disturbances [25], [26]. The SIS mode [23] comprises of nodes in two states : susceptible
(S) or infected (I). While an infected node returns to susceptible state with probability δ, a
susceptible node gets the infection from an infected neighbor with probability β. Here, δ and
β are parameters of the infection. Similarly, the SIR model [23] has nodes in three states:
susceptible (S), infected (I) and removed (R), differing from the SIS model in the fact that a
infected node enters the removed state with probability γ and stays in that state.
We consider a particular case of SIS and SIR infection propagation specified by the values
of their respective parameters. Figs. 10(a) and 10(b) show averaged results for SIS simulation
on the Western American Power Grid and the ERCOT network. In either figure, average results
derived from simulations on similar-sized networks formed by our generative model are also
plotted for comparison. Next, Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) show the results of simulating SIR infection
on the Western American Power Grid and ERCOT grid and on similar sized networks gener-
ated by our generative model. The similarity between the infection propagation curves in real
and generated networks highlights the potential use of our generative model in designing grid
resilience measures.
X. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the topological characteristics of large power grids, specifically the Western
US and ERCOT power grid, and presents an intuitive and analytical generative model for their
physical networks. The model simulates the growth of power grids as a temporally evolving point
process where cost effective transmission lines are built to connect new nodes for reliable delivery
of electricity. Through analysis and simulations, it is shown that the nodal degree distribution
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Fig. 10. Comparison of SIS infection propagation in real power grids and generative model networks. (a) Western US power
grid (b) ERCOT power grid
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Fig. 11. Comparison of SIR infection propagation in real power grids and generative model networks. (a) Western US power
grid (b) ERCOT power grid
produced by the generative model is a weighted sum of shifted exponentials that matches with
the observed degree distributions in several American and European power grids. The efficacy
of the generative model is further demonstrated by comparing several graph features, namely
graph diameter, node and edge betweenness centralities, spread of eigen-values and clustering
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coefficients, of real grids with that of similar sized simulated networks. The similarities in
characteristics signify that the generative model can be used to theoretically study common
topological attributes in large power grids and derive analytical results to quantify and improve
their functioning and robustness. As an elucidatory example, dynamics of SIS and SIR infection
propagation are conducted on real grid topologies and similar sized artificial networks produced
by the generative model. Simulations verify that the generative model provides a good match
for the temporal dynamics of infection propagation in the real grids. Incorporating additional
features of the power grid into our generative model without sacrificing mathematical tractability
of the model is challenging. This is the focus of our future research in this domain.
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